Explications

Un article très éclairant de Juan Cole: résumé en français et article dans son intégralité en anglais.

1/ les résultats publiés annoncent qu'Ahmadinejad aurait remporté la ville de Tabriz avec 57% des voix. Son principal adversaire, Moussavi, est un Azéri originaire de la province d'Azerbaidjan dont Tabriz est la capitale; tous les sondages le donnaient vainqueur dans la région, qui a toujours voté pour ses candidats. (les Azéris représentent 25% de la population iranienne)
2/ Ahmadinejad n'est pas populaire dans les villes, qu'il s'agisse des quartiers riches (pro-réformateurs), ou des quartiers pauvres (qui ont soufferts de l'inflation). Le résultat officiel de 50% de voix pour Ahmadinejad à Téhéran est tout simplement absurde.
3/ Les résultats officiels ne donnent que 320 000 voix à Karoubi, l'autre réformiste, qui avait pourtant emporté 17% des suffrages aux précédentes élections... Il est issu de la minorité Lore, qui le soutient massivement, et est très populaire au Kurdistan. Dans ces conditions, il est plus qu'improbable qu'à ces élections il ait recueilli moins d'1% des voix.
(4) - 5/ Les scores annoncés par Ahmadinejad étaient relativement uniformes à travers l'Iran alors que tous les scrutins précédents montrent de fortes disparités régionales, en particulier en fonction des ethnies dominantes.
6/ La commission électorale est censée attendre 3 jours avant de certifier les résultats des élections. Khamenei a approuvé les résultats avant même que les bulletins aient fini d'être dépouillés.

Article complet

Stealing the Iranian Election

Top Pieces of Evidence that the Iranian Presidential Election Was Stolen

1. It is claimed that Ahmadinejad won the city of Tabriz with 57%. His main opponent, Mir Hossein Mousavi, is an Azeri from Azerbaijan province, of which Tabriz is the capital. Mousavi, according to such polls as exist in Iran and widespread anecdotal evidence, did better in cities and is popular in Azerbaijan. Certainly, his rallies there were very well attended. So for an Azeri urban center to go so heavily for Ahmadinejad just makes no sense. In past elections, Azeris voted disproportionately for even minor presidential candidates who hailed from that province.

2. Ahmadinejad is claimed to have taken Tehran by over 50%. Again, he is not popular in the cities, even, as he claims, in the poor neighborhoods, in part because his policies have produced high inflation and high unemployment. That he should have won Tehran is so unlikely as to raise real questions about these numbers. [Ahmadinejad is widely thought only to have won Tehran in 2005 because the pro-reform groups were discouraged and stayed home rather than voting.)

3. It is claimed that cleric Mehdi Karoubi, the other reformist candidate, received 320,000 votes, and that he did poorly in Iran's western provinces, even losing in Luristan. He is a Lur and is popular in the west, including in Kurdistan. Karoubi received 17 percent of the vote in the first round of presidential elections in 2005. While it is possible that his support has substantially declined since then, it is hard to believe that he would get less than one percent of the vote. Moreover, he should have at least done well in the west, which he did not.

4. Mohsen Rezaie, who polled very badly and seems not to have been at all popular, is alleged to have received 670,000 votes, twice as much as Karoubi.

5. Ahmadinejad's numbers were fairly standard across Iran's provinces. In past elections there have been substantial ethnic and provincial variations.

6. The Electoral Commission is supposed to wait three days before certifying the results of the election, at which point they are to inform Khamenei of the results, and he signs off on the process. The three-day delay is intended to allow charges of irregularities to be adjudicated. In this case, Khamenei immediately approved the alleged results.

I am aware of the difficulties of catching history on the run. Some explanation may emerge for Ahmadinejad's upset that does not involve fraud. For instance, it is possible that he has gotten the credit for spreading around a lot of oil money in the form of favors to his constituencies, but somehow managed to escape the blame for the resultant high inflation.

But just as a first reaction, this post-election situation looks to me like a crime scene.

(Suite et autres articles sur : http://www.juancole.com/ )